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Abstract
We reﬁne our algebraic axiomatization in [8,9] of epistemic actions and epistemic update (notions
deﬁned in [5,6] using Kripke-style semantics), to incorporate a mechanism for dynamic belief re-
vision in a multi-agent setting. We encode revision as a particular form of epistemic update, as a
result of which we can revise with epistemic propositions as well as facts, we can also revise theories
about actions as well as about states of the worlds, and we can do multi-agent belief revision. We
show how our setting can be applied to a cheating version of the muddy children puzzle where by
using this logic, after the cheating happens, honest children will not get contradictory beliefs.
Keywords: Belief Revision, Algebra, Quantale, Epistemic Update, Dynamic Logic, Epistemic
Logic.
1 Introduction
We reﬁne our algebraic axiomatization in [8,9] of epistemic actions and epis-
temic update (notions deﬁned in [5,6] using a relational, Kripke-style seman-
tics), to incorporate a mechanism for dynamic belief revision in a multi-agent
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setting. Our approach has a number of novel features, when compared with
traditional belief revision systems such as AGM [2]. Firstly, while traditional
belief revision was dealing only the revision of theories comprised of ”facts”, we
can also revise theories comprised of epistemic/doxastic propositions. Thus,
some of traditional AGM postulates have to be modiﬁed in order to deal with
non-stable epistemic propositions, such as the ones generated by the so-called
Moore sentences 3 . Secondly, ours is a dynamic belief revision, i.e. a particu-
lar form of update: an action q happens, changing the original theory m to a
revised theory m ∗ q. Thirdly, this dynamic character is enhanced by the fact
that we allow revision of actions, and not just of ”static” theories. That is,
we allow the agent to have theories about the current action, and these may
also be revised by further actions. Fourthly, we do multi-agent belief revision,
as opposed to traditional approaches that only revise the beliefs of one agent.
Our approach, though related in aim, is diﬀerent in ﬂavor from the work of
[14] on Kripke-style belief revision and from the more recent work of [3,15] on
dynamic belief revision. These approaches are semantic and ”quantitative”,
that is they are based on having ”degrees of belief” as the quantitative basis
of belief revision. Our approach, on the contrary, is purely qualitative and ax-
iomatic, and is thus closer in spirit to the traditional AGM approach. Indeed,
our aim is simply to ﬁnd the ”correct” axiomatization of the dynamic and
multi-agent version of AGM.
This paper is organized as follows: in the ﬁrst section we introduce mathe-
matical deﬁnitions of the concepts used in our algebra: our main mathematical
object being the notion of a dynamic revision system, which is based on the
epistemic systems as algebraic models of Dynamic Epistemic Logic; we also
discuss the connection between our dynamic revision operator, which general-
izes the update product, and the traditional AGM revision. Next section deals
with introduction of agents and their views, to be able to do multi-agent belief
revision, and enrichment of the structure with positive and negative test and
with leaning actions, to deal with applications. Finally in the last section, we
apply our multi-agent learning systems, that is multi-agent dynamic revision
systems with learning, to encode and solve a cheating version of the muddy
children puzzle and show how by using our logic, after the cheating, the honest
children learn that they are deceived ; so they revise their beliefs accordingly
and will not have contradictory beliefs.
3 E.g. the agent (”you”) is informed that the ”The cat is on the mat, but you don’t know
it”.
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2 Dynamic Revision Systems
We introduce here a dynamic analogue of the classical AGM axioms of belief
revision. For the moment, we neglect the agents doing the revision, concen-
trating (as in the AGM approach) on a purely impersonal notion of rational
belief revision. In the next section, we will re-introduce the agents (and their
views of the world) into the picture. Our setting is based on the notion of sys-
tem, which is a structure composed of a pair quantale-module (M,Q) linked
by an action
−⊗− : M ×Q → M ,
subject to some conditions. Systems are very general algebraic settings for
modelling dynamical phenomena. Quantales have been used to study diﬀer-
ent phenomena such as concurrent processes in [1] and physical properties
of Quantum Mechanics in [10]. They have also been studied as models of
Dynamic Logic for example in [12]. For a detailed mathematical study of
quantales and their properties, we refer the reader to [13].
Deﬁnition 2.1 A system (M,Q,⊗) consists of:
(1) a complete sup-lattice M = (M,
∨
), with
∨
as the supremum operator;
(2) a quantale Q = (Q,
∨
, •, 1), i.e. a complete sup-lattice (Q,
∨
) endowed
with an additional monoidal structure (Q, •, 1);
(3) a right-module structure on M, i.e. an action −⊗− : M ×Q → M on the
quantale, which is sup-preserving in both arguments and satisﬁes:
m⊗ (q • q′) = (m⊗ q)⊗ q′ for m ∈ M and q, q′ ∈ Q .
We call the elements of the module M , theories or propositions or also
situations. These situations are not neccessarily deterministic, as our theories
might not be complete. There exists exactly one inconsistent theory, namely
⊥ :=
∨
∅. Similarly, there exists exactly one trivial (tautological) theory,
namely  :=
∨
M . In a possible-world model, elements of M can be mod-
elled as sets of possible worlds, representing some theory (or belief) 4 about
the real world: it is believed 5 that the real world belongs to this set. How-
ever, one can also represent theories, as it is standard in belief revision, in an
intensional way, that is, as sets of sentences of some language closed under
logical consequence 6 .
4 This theory may be of course held by some (arbitrary) agent. This agent is left implicit
here, but in the next section we will introduce it explicitly.
5 See the previous footnote.
6 Algebraically, theories in this sense correspond to ﬁlters in a complete lattice, or Boolean
algebra.
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The lattice order m ≤ m′ on the module M represents the consequence
relation, that is the logical entailment T 
 T ′ between theories. In terms
of theories as sets of possible worlds, this is simply set inclusion ⊆. But in
terms of deductively closed theories as sets of sentences, it is reversed inclusion
T ⊇ T ′. So in particular our join m ∨ m′ corresponds to union in terms of
sets of possible worlds, i.e. it is logical disjunction of propositions, but notice
that it also corresponds to intersection T ∩T ′ of sets of sentences. Dually, our
meet m ∧m′ is the logical conjunction of propositions, i.e. the intersection of
the two sets of worlds, but it also corresponds to the deductive closure of the
union Cl(T ∪ T ′) of the sets of sentences of the two theories.
We call the elements of the quantale Q epistemic actions, or experiments,
or also announcements. They are information-changing actions, which do not
change the objective facts of the world, but only uncover, discover, or commu-
nicate them. One can think of elements of quantale as scientiﬁc experiments,
or even better as actions of communicating the results of an experiment. More
generally, they may cover any communication of, for example facts or hy-
pothesis about the world, or even about what is (not) known about the world,
etc. Since these actions are not necessarily deterministic, they might also be
thought of as ”theories about the current action”. That is there might be un-
certainty about what exactly has been discovered or announced. The lattice
order q ≤ q′ on the quantale Q is the order of non-determinism: q′ contains
less information about the current action (and thus is more non-determined)
than q. The quantale multiplication q • q′ represents sequential composition of
actions: ﬁrst do q, then do q′. The unit 1 of multiplication stands for the skip
or the ”do-nothing” action.
Observe the lack of a Boolean structure: there is no negation in M , or in
Q. One can of course deﬁne some pseudo-complement, as is usually done in
complete lattices, but this will not necessarily behave as a Boolean negation.
This lack is the result of a conscious choice: we think this algebraic setting
is simpler, more transparent and more general than the one that one would
obtain by adding negation 7 . Moreover, it is applicable to cases of partial
information. In particular, when thinking of M as consisting of ”theories”,
there is no meaningful notion of ”negation of a theory”; similarly, there is no
action that can be called ”the negation” of action q. However, as we show
bellow, one can deﬁne in some sense a ”propositional negation” of an action.
The operation ⊗ is called update product and it encodes the way in which
an action changes a situation or theory. That is, if a theory m correctly
describes the current situation and q is a correct description of the current
7 However, it would be easy to extend our setting to intuitionistic or Boolean settings, by
requiring the module to be a Heyting or a Boolean Algebra.
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action, then the theory m ⊗ q will correctly describe the situation after the
action.
Kernel. An inconsistent situation: m⊗q = ⊥ simply means that the action q
is impossible in (the situation described by) m. The condition of impossibility
of a given action can be encoded as a proposition in M , by deﬁning the kernel
of action q as:
ker(q) =
∨
{m ∈ M | m⊗ q = ⊥} .
This is the weakest theory/situation that makes this action impossible. The
kernel can be thought of as a ”strong negation of an action”: ker(q) is the
proposition asserting the impossibility of action q. 8
Image Maps. Any action q ∈ Q ”acts” on M via the update product ⊗, and
”acts” on Q itself via multiplication •. As a consequence, we can deﬁne two
notions of image of an action:
ImM(q)= {m⊗ q : m ∈ M}
ImQ(q)= {q′ • q : q′ ∈ Q}
Atoms. In a lattice M , the set of atoms is deﬁned as
Atm(M) = {a ∈ M : ∀m ∈ M, (m = ⊥, m ≤ a) ⇒ m = a} .
If existing, the atoms of the module M are called ”states”, and can be thought
of as complete (fully determined) situations, i.e. complete descriptions of the
world. In terms of sets of states (or possible worlds), they simply are the
states (or rather the singleton-sets consisting of only one state). In terms of
theories, they are the complete consistent (i.e. maximally consistent) theo-
ries. 9 Similarly, the atoms of the quantale Q represent deterministic actions
(or, alternatively, complete theories about actions).
Atomicity. A lattice M is atomistic if every element is the supremum of all
the atoms bellow it, i.e. for all m ∈ M we have
m =
∨
{s ∈ Atm(M) : s ≤ m}
A system is called atomistic if both the module M and the quantale Q are
atomistic lattices and if any update product or multiplication of atoms is either
an atom or inconsistent, i.e.:
s ∈ Atm(M) and σ, σ′ ∈ Atm(Q) ⇒
(s⊗ σ ∈ Atm(M) ∪ {⊥} and σ • σ′ ∈ Atm(Q) ∪ {⊥})
8 In the ”concrete” Kripke-model-based setting of [5,6], the role of the kernel was played by
its complement, the precondition pre(q) of an action, deﬁnining its conditions of possibility.
9 Algebraically, these can be the ultraﬁlters in a Boolean algebra.
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This condition expresses a natural property of determinism: a deterministic
action acts as a partial function on states, i.e. it transforms any (fully deter-
mined) state into a (at most one, fully determined) state (or else, it fails); and
the sequential composition of two deterministic actions (if not failing) is itself
a deterministic action.
Extensionality. A system is called extensional if actions are uniquely deter-
mined by their behavior on situations, i.e.:
if ∀m ∈ M, m⊗ q = m⊗ q′ then q = q′ .
As a consequence of this, we have that:
if ker(q) =  then q = ⊥ .
This is because if the kernel of an action q is  then the action cannot be
applied to any proposition. That is if ker(q) =  then for all m ∈ M we
have m⊗ q = ⊥. But epistemic update is bottom-preserving in the sense that
⊥ = m⊗⊥. So we have m⊗ q = m ⊗⊥ and if the system is extensional we
get q = ⊥.
Facts. Since we think of our actions as ”purely epistemic” (i.e. actions of
discovery, belief-change or communication), they do not aﬀect the ”objective”
features of the world. In other words, they do not change the ”facts” of the
world. We can turn things around, by deﬁnining ”facts” to be the propositions
that are invariant under any actions, i.e. the ones that are ”stable” under any
update. In other words, the set of ”facts” is deﬁned as the ”stabilizer” of all
actions:
Stab(Q) = {m ∈ M : ∀q ∈ Q, m⊗ q ≤ m} .
Note that in our system any proposition that is invariant under actions is called
a fact. For example since update preserves all joins including the empty join
∨∅ = ⊥, we have ⊥⊗ q = ⊥, which says bottom is invariant under any action
and thus a fact. But it is a fact in which we are not interested, since it is
wrong!
Dynamic Modalities. Since the update product preserves joins on both of
its arguments, it has a (Galois) right adjoint, deﬁned as
[q]m′ :=
∨
{m ∈ M : m⊗ q ≤ m′} .
This adjoint [q]m is the standard dynamic (action) modality of Propositional
Dynamic Logic or PDL [12]. It reads as ‘after action q proposition m holds’
and denotes the weakest precondition of an action. That is, the weakest propo-
sition that should be true before q, so that proposition m becomes true after
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q. The adjunction −⊗ q  [q]− implies the equivalence:
m⊗ q ≤ m′ iﬀ m ≤ [q]m′
Residuals. Since the multiplication − • − : Q × Q → Q preserves joins in
both arguments, it has two right adjoints, called left and right residuals. The
right residual is the right adjoints of − • q′ : Q → Q and is denoted by
q/q′ :=
∨
{q′′ ∈ Q : q′′ • q′ ≤ q} .
The left residual is the right adjoint of q′ •− : Q×Q → Q, is denoted by q′\q
and is deﬁned symmetrically.
We now enrich the notion of system with a way to revise old theories both
about the world and about actions in the view of new experiments:
Deﬁnition 2.2 A dynamic revision operator on a system (M,Q,⊗) is a pair
∗ = (∗M , ∗Q) of maps
− ∗M − : M ×Q → M, − ∗Q − : Q×Q → Q
satisfying a list of conditions (to be given). In practice, we skip the superscripts
whenever possible. The required conditions are the following:
(i) m ∗ q ∈ ImM(q) and q ∗ q′ ∈ ImQ(q′)
(ii) m⊗ q ≤ m ∗ q and q • q′ ≤ q ∗ q′
(iii) if m⊗ q = ⊥ then m ∗ q ≤ m⊗ q, and if q • q′ = ⊥ then q ∗ q′ ≤ q • q′
(iv) if m ∗ q = ⊥ then q = ⊥ ; similarly: if q ∗ q′ = ⊥ then q′ = ⊥
(v) m ∗ (q ∗ q′) = (m ∗ q) ∗ q′ and q ∗ (q′ ∗ q′′) = (q ∗ q′) ∗ q′′
A system enriched with this revision operator is:
Deﬁnition 2.3 A dynamic revision system is an extensional, atomistic sys-
tem endowed with a dynamic revision operator.
Explanation of Conditions. In this section we explain how the above
conditions are dynamic equivalents of the classical AGM clauses. We start
with the intuition about m ∗ q:
If m is the current (possibly incorrect) theory about the world, then m ∗ q
represents the (”rationally”) revised theory after the experiment q is per-
formed.
We call this ”dynamic” revision, since m∗q is the actual theory about the state
of the world after the action q: it is not a revised theory about the original
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state of the world before the action 10 . Similarly, the intuition about q ∗ q′ is
If q is a (possibly incorrect) theory about what action is going on, then q ∗ q′
represents the revised theory (about what is going on) after the experiment
q′ is performed.
First part of condition (i) says that the revised theory m∗q has to be consistent
with the experiment q, that is
m ∗ q ∈ ImM (q) means ∃m′ ∈ M ′, m ∗ q = m′ ⊗ q .
This says that the new theory can be thought of as the result of updating some
previously existing situation m′ with the actual experiment q. The situation
m′ expresses some tentative theory about the original state of the world. This
tentative theory is consistent with the result of the new experiment q, that is
m′ ⊗ q = ⊥. In other words, this expresses a possible “static belief revision”
of m (with the information provided by q). This is expressed in the following
proposition, equivalent to ﬁrst part of condition (i):
Proposition 2.4 For the tentative theory m′ that is consistent with experi-
ment q and for which we have m ∗ q = m′ ⊗ q, the following is true:
m′ ≤ [q](m ∗ q)
The proof follows directly by applying the adjunction − ⊗ q  [q]− to the
equality m′⊗ q = m ∗ q. The proposition says that m′ is the weakest tentative
belief consistent with q. As a result, the tentative belief that an agent might
have about the prior situation (the situation before q) after action q, will be
([q](m ∗ q))⊗ q. This can be seen as a tentative retroactive justiﬁcation of the
particular dynamic belief revision m∗ q, in terms of a static belief revision m′.
The second part of condition (i) is interpreted similarly to the ﬁrst part.
It says that the revised theory has to be consistent with the experiment, that
is
q ∗ q′ ∈ ImQ(q′) means ∃q′′ ∈ Q, q ∗ q′ = q′′ • q′ .
A similar version of the above proposition can be stated for the second part.
Conditions (ii) and (iii) together, say that in the case the original theory
is consistent with the experiment q, that is when m ⊗ q = ⊥, the theory is
simply ”updated” with the action q using the update product:
if m⊗ q = ⊥ then m ∗ q = m⊗ q
Otherwise, the theory m has been refuted by the experiment q, and it has to
be revised. Similarly, in the case the original action theory is consistent with
10 In contrast, classical ”static” belief revision deals with revised theories about the original
state of the world.
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the experiment, the two action theories are simply composed sequentially in
q • q′: the new theory says that action q followed by action q′ has been going
on:
if q • q′ = ⊥ then q ∗ q′ = q • q′
Condition (iv) corresponds to the AGM clause of “success of revision”; it
says that revision with some consistent new information q such that q = ⊥, is
always successful, in the sense that the revised theory is consistent m∗ q = ⊥.
Finally, condition (v) imposes two types of transitivity of revision 11 . It
is a dynamic version of the classic AGM condition about revision with a con-
junction φ∧ψ. Since we have two types of revisions (one for propositions and
one for actions), we need to relate the two. In particular, the ﬁrst clause of
the ﬁfth axiom is about the consistency of revision of actions with revision of
propositions. It says that if we revise a proposition m with an action q that
has itself been revised by another action q′, we get the same revision as when
we ﬁrst revise m with q and then with q′. It can also be seen as a way of
deﬁning revision of actions q ∗ q′ in terms of revision of propositions.
3 Multi-Agent Dynamic Belief Revision
We want to introduce in the picture agents and their views about the world
and about actions.
Deﬁnition 3.1 A dynamic-revision endomorphism 12 on a dynamic revision
system (M,Q,⊗, ∗) is a pair f = (fM , fQ) of maps
fM : M → M, fQ : Q → Q ,
satisfying some extra-conditions (to be given below). As before, we skip the
superscripts whenever possible. The conditions are:
(i) Both fM and fQ are sup-preserving maps, and fQ(1) = 1
(ii) For atoms s ∈ Atm(M), σ ∈ Atm(Q) such that s⊗ σ = ⊥, we have
f(s⊗ σ) = f(s) ∗ f(σ)
11 Technically speaking, we will not need this last condition, since all its instances that are
relevant to us will follow from the axioms on belief revision endomorphisms in the next
section.
12 Note that this notion diﬀers essentially from the notion of epistemic endomorphism
in [8,9]: in the conditions corresponding to the last two conditions above, the epistemic
endomorphisms had update product ⊗, and respectively composition •, instead of dynamic
revision ∗.
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(iii) For atoms σ, σ′ ∈ Atm(Q) such that σ • σ′ = ⊥, we have
f(σ • σ′) = f(σ) ∗ f(σ′)
Intuitively, we think of f(m) as the theory that an arbitrary agent has
about the situation described by m: when the real situation is given m, the
agent believes that this situation is given by (his theory) f(m). Similarly, we
think of f(q) as the theory that the (unspeciﬁed) agent has about the action
q.
Deﬁnition 3.2 A dynamic-revision endomorphism f is said to be doxastic
(or D45) if it satisﬁes the following additional conditions:
D. (“Consistency of beliefs”): ker(f) = ⊥
45. (“Introspection”): f ◦ f = f
A doxastic dynamic-revision endomorphism is also called an appearance map.
The intuition is that the theory f(m) that the arbitrary agent has about
the situation m, gives the ”appearance” of this situation to the agent (or the
”view” that the agent on this situation). Axiom D says that, in any consistent
situation m = ⊥, the agent has consistent theory f(m) = ⊥. Axiom 45 says
that the apearance mp is idempotent, i.e. the agent is introspective: the theory
f(f(m)) that he has about (the situation represented by) his own theory f(m)
coincides with his theory, that is f(f(m)) = f(m).
Note: The notion of epistemic endomorphism in [8,9] was not required to
satisfy the D45 conditions. Moreover, in that context, condition D was not
satisﬁed by the examples, since (in speciﬁc examples) it was contradicted by
the nature of update product: agents may indeed come to inconsistent believes
when using the update product of [5,6] to update their beliefs! The reason,
again, was the absence of a mechanism for belief revision.
Deﬁnition 3.3 A multi-agent dynamic belief revision system
(M,Q,⊗, ∗, {fA}A∈A)
is a dynamic revision system (M,Q,⊗, ∗) endowed with a family of appearance
maps (=doxastic dynamic-revision system endomorphisms), indexed by a set
of “agents” A ∈ A.
The element fA(m) ∈ M is called the appearance of (situation) m to agent
A, or the theory of A about m. Diﬀerent agents may have diﬀerent views of
the same situation, or diﬀerent interpretations of the same theory. Similarly,
fA(q) is the appearance of action q to agent A. In other words, fA(q) repre-
sents what agent A thinks is going on when in reality action q is going on. For
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instance diﬀerent appearance maps fA(q) might represent diﬀerent interpre-
tations or diﬀerent views of the experiment q. An experiment might be public
or private, its results might be communicated only to some of the agents,
or some outsiders might be deluded by their dogmatic beliefs into rejecting,
misunderstanding or misinterpreting the experiment.
The essential diﬀerence between this notion and the notion of epistemic
system in [8,9] comes from the clauses for the appearance of an updated situ-
ation, and of a composition of actions, which is
fA(s⊗ σ) = fA(s) ∗ fA(σ)
This means that the theory agent A has about the world after the experiment
σ, is obtained by dynamically revising A’s old theory about the world fA(s)
with A’s theory fA(σ) about the experiment. That is, in case the experiment
appears to contradict the old theory, the contradiction is solved by the agent
in favor of the experiment (using the dynamic revision operator). Similarly,
the identity
fA(σ • σ
′) = fA(σ) ∗ fA(σ
′)
means that the theory A has about the composed action σ • σ′ is obtained by
dynamically revising A’s theory about the ﬁrst action with A’s theory about
the second action.
Belief. The belief modality A can be deﬁned as the right-adjoint of the
appearance map: fA(−)  A−. Indeed, since the appearance maps are join-
preserving maps, they have meet-preserving Galois right adjoints which are
deﬁned as:
Am
′ =
∨
{m ∈ M : fA(m) ≤ m
′} .
Formally that is to say
fA(m) ≤ m
′ iﬀ m ≤ Am
′ .
We read Am as “agent A believes theory m ”. A similar notion Aq can
be deﬁned for actions. One can easily see that the belief modality has the
properties of a normal modality, and moreover (due to the D45 conditions
above), it satisﬁes ”Introspection” (A m = AA m) and ”Consistency of
beliefs” (A = ).
Multi-Agent Learning Systems. To deal with applications, it is useful
to enrich our structure a bit, allowing it to deal with positive and negative
tests, and with learning actions (and as a consequence, with public/private
announcements and refutations).
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Deﬁnition 3.4 A multi-agent learning system is a multi-agent dynamic belief
revision system
(M,Q,⊗, ∗, {fA}A∈A) ,
endowed with maps
−? : M ×M → Q and LB : Q → Q ,
for each set B ⊆ A of agents. These maps are required to satisfy certain
conditions, to be given below. As a notation, we put m?n :=?(m,n). We read
it as
m?n is the experiment of ”testing” m and (simultaneously) refuting n.
This is an objective non-epistemic, PDL-like test: theory m is ”tested”, while
theory n is ”refuted”, but without any of the relevant agents being announced
(of the result of the test/refutation).
The action LB q is read as learning of action q by group B . More precisely,
it can be described as: “while an action q is happening, the agents in group
B privately get together and learn (in common, by mutual update) that q is
happening”. This learning action is so private that none of outsiders C ∈ A\B
suspect that it is happening. The required conditions are:
• If s ∈ Atm(M) then s⊗ (m?n) =
⎧⎨
⎩
s if s ≤ m and s ≤ n
⊥ otherwise
• fA(m?n) = 1
• ker(LB q) = ker(q)
• fA(LB q) =
⎧⎨
⎩
LB q for A ∈ B
1 for A /∈ B
The ﬁrst clause says that a state survives a test/refutation m?n iﬀ it sat-
isﬁes the tested property but it doesn’t satisfy the refuted property; in which
case the state is left unchanged by the state. The second clause says that the
appearance of a pure test/refutation action to all agents is 1, i.e. the action
skip in which “nothing happens”. This expresses the fact that such a PDL-
like test is non-epistemic: agents do not learn anything from it. The third
clause says that learning an action q is (im)possible iﬀ the learned action q is
(im)possible. Finally, the fourth clause says that the learning action appears
as ”learning” to all the agents involved in it, and it appears as skip to all the
outsiders.
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Public/Private Announcements/Refutations. In a multi-agent learning
system, we can deﬁne a mutual announcement-and-refutation to a group B of
agents, by putting:
m!Bn := LB(m?n) .
Notice that this is a ”combined” action, in which something (m) is mutually
announced, while something else (n) is mutually refuted. More ”pure” special
cases of this are mutual announcements and mutual refutations:
m!B := m!B⊥ and !Bm := !B m.
Even more special cases are public announcements and public refutations:
m! := m!A and !m :=!A m.
Also private announcements and private refutations to one agent
m!A := m!{A} and !Am :=!{A} m.
Examples: Secret, Secure Communication and Secret Interception.
The passing of a secret (truthful) message m from A to B (over a secure
channel) is represented by the action m!A,B. If the channel is not really secure
and in fact the message is secretely intercepted (and read, but allowed to go
further) by an agent C, then the action is represented by
LC(m!A,B) .
Using the deﬁnition of the learning action, we can calculate the kernels
of the actions deﬁned above. For example we can prove that the refuted
proposition of a public refutation constitutes its kernel. That is, a public
refutation cannot be applied on the states where the refuted proposition holds.
In other words:
Lemma 3.5 For a public refutation !m and an atom s ∈ Atm(M) we have
s⊗!m = ⊥ iﬀ s ≤ m.
On the other hand, for a public announcement, every proposition but the
announced one is in the kernel. That is a public announcement action can
only be applied on the states where the announced proposition holds. In other
words:
Lemma 3.6 For a public announcement m! and an atom s ∈ Atm(M) we
have
s⊗m! = ⊥ iﬀ s ≤ m.
Proofs are easy and follow directly from the deﬁnition of the kernel of
the learning action and how public announcements and refutation actions are
deﬁned in terms of the learning action.
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4 ”Cheating Muddy Children” with Dynamic Belief
Revision.
In this section we apply our setting to the muddy children puzzle, for a full
discussion of its original form we refer the reader to [11]. The puzzle has been
solved using the update product in kripke structures in [5,6] and using the
update product in the algebraic setting of epistemic systems in [8,9]. Here, we
ﬁrst go through the algebraic analysis of the original puzzle, however, since
our interest is in a cheating version of the puzzle, which has been originally
presented in [4] and also discussed in [8], we encode and solve the cheating
version in the algebra. We show where the epistemic update approach of [4,8]
fails and how our current version with the revision operator solves the problem;
this being the contribution of the dynamic belief revision of this paper to the
cheating version of the muddy children puzzle: honest children learn that they
are deceived and thus will not have contradictory beliefs after the cheating.
The Original Puzzle. For the purpose of this paper, we deal with with four
children three of them dirty. Suppose children 1, 2, and 3 are the dirty ones
and child 4 is clean. We assume given a learning system and encode the puzzle
in it as follows. The children are in the set of agents:
{1, 2, 3, 4} ⊆ A ,
the module M includes some atomic situations (”states”) sB for B ⊆ A.
Each sB represents the situation in which the dirty children are precisely the
ones in the group B. For instance the following state represents the real state,
that is the state in which the ﬁrst three children have dirty foreheads:
s1,2,3 ∈ Atm(M)
We also have some stable propositions in Stab(Q) ⊆ M , some saying ‘child i
is dirty’, and some ‘child i is clean’:
Di, Di ∈ Stab(Q) for i = 1, 2, 3, 4 .
These are “facts” that cannot be changed by epistemic actions, so that is why
we assume them to belong to Stab(Q). Each state satisﬁes its corresponding
facts, i.e. we put
sB ≤ Di iﬀ i ∈ B ,
and
sB ≤ Di otherwise .
In any state sB, each child sees the faces of other children but not his own, so
he doesn’t know if he’s dirty or not. This is encoded in the appearance maps,
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by putting
fi(sB) = sB∪{i} ∨ sB\{i} ,
for example in the real state s1,2,3 where child one is dirty, he thinks either he
is or he is not dirty: the real state appears to him as f1(s1,2,3) = s1,2,3 ∨ s2,3.
Father’s ﬁrst announcement that “At least some one is dirty” can be rep-
resented as a public announcement:
q0 := (∨
4
i=1Di)!
which is assumed to be an atomic element of our quantale Q. By the above
deﬁnition of public announcements, we have
fi(q0) = q0 for all 1 ≤ i ≤ 4
This says that every child hears this announcement. Every round in which
all children answer “I don’t know that I am dirty” is represented by a public
refutation, which is also an atomic element of the quantale:
q :=!(∨4i=1iDi)
with the refuted proposition as its kernel. With these assumptions, we have
formalized the original statement of the puzzle, that after two rounds of no
answers each dirty child knows that he is dirty, and prove it in [8,9]. But here
we are interested in a cheating version of the puzzle, which we are going to
deal with below.
The Cheating Version. The muddy children puzzle has several cheating
versions in which diﬀerent cheating and lying actions happen between the
children, for example for a lying version has been solved in [8]. In this paper
we deal with the scenario discussed in [4]: this scenario is the same as the
original version until before the second round of answers. That is, father
makes his announcement and children answer no in the ﬁrst round of answers,
but after the ﬁrst round, children 2 and 3 cheat by secretly communicating to
each other that they are dirty. The state of the system after the announcement
and the ﬁrst round of no answers is:
s′ = s1,2,3 ⊗ q0 ⊗ q ,
the cheating is encoded as a secret message passing:
π := (D2 ∧D3)!{2,3} .
Notice that, as discussed before, this action appears to children 1 and 4 as
skip: f1(π) = f4(π) = 1. The new state of the system after this cheating is
s′′ := s′ ⊗ π .
Now the cheating children know they are dirty! Thus, in the second round of
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answers, while children 1 and 4 proceed as usual (that is they refute that they
know they are dirty
!(1D1 ∨ 4D4) ,
the cheating children announce that they know they are dirty
(2D2 ∧ 3D3)!
So this second round of answers is a combination of yes and no anwers, i.e. a
public refutation by children 1 and 4 and a public announcement by children
2 and 3 at the same time. This can be encoded as a mutual announcement-
and-refutation to a group action
q′ = (2D2 ∧ 3D3)!1D1 ∨4D4 .
After q′, child 1 will wrongly conclude that she is clean! In our system, this
statement is expressed by the following inequality:
Proposition 4.1
s1,2,3 ≤ [q0 • q • π • q
′]1D1 .
Proof (Sketch) We ﬁrst use the adjunction between update and dynamic
modality to take [q0 • q • π • q
′] to the left hand side:
s1,2,3 ⊗ (q0 • q • π • q
′) ≤ 1D1 .
Similarly, use the knoweldge-appearance adjunction to take the 1 to the left
hand side:
f1 (s1,2,3 ⊗ (q0 • q • π • q
′)) ≤ D1 .
Since the sequential composition and update of atoms is an atom, we have
(q0 • q • π • q
′) ∈ Atm(Q)
and also
(s1,2,3 ⊗ (q0 • q • π • q
′)) ∈ Atm(M) .
Conditions two and three of the dynamic revision endomorphism (deﬁnition
3.1) tell us that for atoms s ∈ Atm(M) and σ, σ′ ∈ Atm(Q) we have:
f(s⊗ σ) = f(s) ∗ f(σ) and f(σ • σ′) = f(σ) ∗ f(σ′) .
So we can distribute our f1 on the tensor and replace the updates and sequen-
tial compositions with our revisions operator to get:
f1 (s1,2,3 ⊗ (q0 • q • π • q
′)) = f1(s1,2,3) ∗ f1(q0) ∗ f1(q) ∗ f1(π) ∗ f1(q
′) ,
and it would be enough to show
f1(s1,2,3) ∗ f1(q0) ∗ f1(q) ∗ f1(π) ∗ f1(q
′) ≤ D1 .
We replace the f1 maps with their values (introduced above as assumptions)
and we have to show
(s1,2,3 ∨ s2,3) ∗ q0 ∗ q ∗ 1 ∗ q
′ ≤ D1 .
A. Baltag, M. Sadrzadeh / Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science 157 (2006) 37–5652
According to the lemma 3.6 for the public announcement of the father q0 = (∨
4
i=1Di)!
we have
s2,3 ⊗ q0 = ⊥
this is because by assumption s2,3 ≤ D2 and D2 /∈ ker(q0), so we get
s2,3 ⊗ q0 = ⊥ and consequently (s1,2,3 ⊗ q0) ∨ (s2,3 ⊗ q0) = ⊥
which is equal to
(s1,2,3 ∨ s2,3)⊗ q0 = ⊥ .
Now by axioms 2 and 3 of deﬁnition 2.2:
(s1,2,3 ∨ s2,3) ∗ q0 = (s1,2,3 ∨ s2,3)⊗ q0 ,
and by the same line of argument for actions q and q′ we get
(s1,2,3 ∨ s2,3) ∗ q0 ∗ q ∗ q
′ = (s1,2,3 ∨ s2,3)⊗ q0 ⊗ q ⊗ q
′
and it would be enough to show
(s1,2,3 ∨ s2,3)⊗ q0 ⊗ q ⊗ q
′ ≤ D1 .
Since update distributes over joins, we now have to prove two cases:
s1,2,3 ⊗ q0 ⊗ q ⊗ q
′ ≤ D1 and s2,3 ⊗ q0 ⊗ q ⊗ q
′ ≤ D1 .
The second disjunct is true since by assumptions we have s2,3 ≤ D1 and D1 is a
fact. The ﬁrst disjunct is proven by induction on the number of dirty children
k. For the proof of induction we refer the reader to the detailed proofs of [8,9].
The diﬀerence is that there we showed
s2,3 ⊗ q0 ⊗ q ⊗ q = ⊥
because until the third round everybody answered no, but here we have to
show
s1,2,3 ⊗ q0 ⊗ q ⊗ q
′ = ⊥
because in the second round children 2 and 3 answer yes. This induction is
done in the similar lines, that is by showing (s1,2,3 ⊗ q0 ⊗ q) ∈ ker(q
′). 
We take this proof to be a “success” of the epistemic system formalism:
we think it accurately predicts the (most likely) behavior of child 1; moreover,
child 1’s belief, though wrong, is justiﬁed by the appearance of the actions to
her.
The Role of Belief Revision: discovering that you have been de-
ceived.
Observe that at this stage of the cheating muddy children, there is a problem
with child 4: he sees that there are at least three dirty children, so children
2 and 3 cannot have come to know so early that they were dirty. We can see
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that there is a contradiction between the announcement q′ and child 4’s beliefs
before this announcement. The state of the system before q′ is s′′ = s′ ⊗ π
where s′ = s1,2,3 ⊗ q0 ⊗ q. But the appearance of s
′′ to child 4 is the same as
the appearance of s′ to him:
f4(s
′′) = f4(s
′ ⊗ π) = f4(s
′) ∗ f4(π) = f4(s
′) ∗ 1 = f4(s
′)⊗ 1 = f4(s
′) ,
So s′′ is indistinguishable to child 4 from the previous state s′, in which the
dirty children did not know they were dirty. Hence, child 4 believes that e.g.
child 2 does not know that he is dirty: f4(s
′′) = f4(s
′) ≤ 2D2. But this is
contradicted by the announcement q′, by which child 2 says he knows he is
dirty. In other words, the appearance of the state s′′ to child 4 is incompatible
with action q′ happening next:
f4(s
′′)⊗ q′ = ⊥ .
Thus, after hearing the announcement q′, child 4 must engage in belief revision,
otherwise he will be lead to have inconsistent beliefs. This is precisely where
the epistemic updates of [4,8] fail: according to the these settings we would
have
f4(s
′′ ⊗ q′) = f4(s
′′)⊗ f4(q
′) = f4(s
′′)⊗ q′ = ⊥ ,
and hence
s′′ ⊗ q′ ≤ 4⊥ ,
which says at the next state, child 4 will believe the impossible. However,
as will be shown in the following proposition, in our dynamic revision setting
this is not the case:
Proposition 4.2 In the dynamic belief revision setting, child 4 successfully
revises his beliefs and will not believe in the impossible:
s′′ ⊗ q′  4⊥
Proof. As before, we use the adjunction to take the 4 to the left hand side
to get
f4(s
′′ ⊗ q′)  ⊥ .
Now observe that
f4(s
′′ ⊗ q′) = f4(s
′′) ∗ f4(q
′) = f4(s
′′) ∗ q′ = ⊥
since q′ = ⊥ and we are done. 
So child 4 has succesfuly revised his beliefs; in fact, our revision axioms
imply that he can also form a new hypothesis m′′ ≤ ker(q′) about the previous
state s′′, hypothesis that can explain his new beliefs:
f4(s
′′) ∗ q′ = m′′ ⊗ q′ .
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5 Conclusion and Future Work
We have presented an algebraic setting for dynamic belief revision in multi-
agent systems. Our main mathematical object is a Belief Revision System
based on Epistemic Systems as algebraic models of Dynamic Epistemic Logic.
We axiomatize a notion of multi-agent dynamic revision, which generalizes
the update product to inconsistent pairs of a theory and an experiment, and
which revises the theory to accommodates the experiment. In our setting,
agents can revise with complex epistemic propositions as well as with facts.
They can also revise past actions in the view of new experiments. We have
applied our setting to a cheating version of the muddy children puzzle, and
show that by using this logic, after the cheating the honest children would not
face any dangerous consequences, in terms of contradiction and confusion.
We are currently working on a complete sequent calculus for this logic,
adapting the work in [8,9] to the present setting. Also, for simplicity we have
chosen here to follow the AGM approach in postulating a uniform revision rule:
”the rational” revision operator. But there exists of course the possibility
of having “personalised revision” operators: by introducing labelled revision
operators ∗A for each agent, we can allow diﬀerent agents to use diﬀerent
revision rules, subject only to minimal rationality constraints. We are planning
to investigate this possibility in future work.
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